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Abstract. The relationship between Shari’ah supervision and Islamic banks’ (IBs) performance is still ambiguous 
particularly for banks across countries that have different regulatory environments. Pakistan adopts an interven-
tionist regulatory approach which is exclusive to Shari’ah governance (SG) system in Pakistan. This approach differs 
from the other adopted approaches in countries that have either high or low degree of regulatory interference. 
Thus, this study examines how Shari’ah supervision mechanism, as represented by the Shari’ah supervisory board, 
and its characteristics, can influence the performance of IBs in Pakistan. The sample comprises 67 Islamic bank-
year observations for the period from 2007 to 2015. The performance-governance relationship is estimated using a 
range of econometric techniques including the dynamic system-GMM estimator. The results reveal modest support 
for a positive association between Shari’ah supervision and performance. The study concludes that SG practices in 
the Pakistani IBs still suffer from some drawbacks which require more improvements by the respective regulators. 
Most of these drawbacks are related to the SG regulatory frameworks which are related to the SSBs’ roles and 
characteristics.
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Introduction
Islamic banks (IBs) offer services similar to the conventional banks (CBs). Nonet-
heless, the main difference between these banks is that IBs are basically operating 
based on the Shari’ah principles (Nomran et al., 2018). This unique Islamic banking 
business model imposes some unique agency issues for IBs. As Zainuldin et al. 
(2018) claim, IBs are also likely to encounter additional agency problem besides 
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the common agency problems that may occur between managers and shareholders, for 
instance in any case managers deviate from their duty, to ensure Shari’ah compliance. 
They add that agency problem also exists between managers and investment account 
holders (IAHs). IAHs share risks with IBs, but they cannot intervene in the IBs manage-
ment decisions over the funds as they transfer the control to the bank (Ghayad, 2008).
Accordingly, the unique governance structure of IBs which comprises the Sha-
ri’ah supervisory boards (SSBs) besides the boards of directors (BoDs) is the main 
feature that makes the governance of IBs distinct from their conventional counter-
parts (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Nomran et al., 2018). SSBs play an important role 
in mitigating agency problems by acting as an additional monitoring mechanism 
(Abdelsalam et al., 2016) that monitors the religious, behavioural, moral and ethi-
cal aspects of corporate management (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017). For this, 
the existence of efficient Shari’ah supervision and effective SSBs are crucial to the 
Islamic banking industry. If the IBs fail to comply with the Shari’ah principles, de-
positors may withdraw their deposits and investors may cancel their investment 
agreements, which would decrease the IBs profitability and increase their risk 
(Nomran et al., 2018). SSB scrutinizes the legality of contract and IBs are obliged 
to undertake only approved contracts (Majeed and Zainab, 2018).
      However, Nomran et al. (2018) assert that the Shari’ah governance1  (SG) 
practices are unregulated in some jurisdictions, whilst in some other jurisdictions, 
the practices are regulated. They also add that while extreme intervention of regula-
tory agencies is preferred by some jurisdictions, it is not preferred by some others. 
Thus, concerns are raised regarding the feasibility of the SG practices as well as the 
independence and qualification of the SSBs in the IBs across jurisdictions that have 
different regulatory environments (Alkhamees, 2013; Grassa, 2013). These concerns 
have become more serious for that current SG practices in most countries are still 
weak and require further improvement especially in the regulatory frameworks that 
are related to the SSBs’ duties and characteristics (Grassa, 2015).
    Many countries develop different SG regulatory models to regulate the Isla-
mic banking and finance activities. As the literature shows, the differences across 
jurisdictions in the degree of intervention of regulatory agencies is reflected in the 
five SG regulatory models, namely, reactive, passive, minimalist, pro-active and in-
1 "Shari’ah governance is referred as the system that provides conformity of all commercial transactions 
and activities of IFIs with Shari’ah" (Zahid and Khan, 2019, p.98).
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terventionist (Hasan, 2010; Hasan, 2012). For the regulated jurisdictions, while the 
pro-active model which is only applied in Malaysia reflects the most extreme inter-
vention of regulatory agencies (Nomran et al., 2018), the minimalist model which is 
applied in Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar reflects the lowest intervention. Besides 
these two models, Pakistan adopts an interventionist regulatory model which is exc-
lusive to Shari’ah governance (SG) system in Pakistan (Hasan, 2010; Hasan, 2012). 
This approach differs from the other adopted approaches in countries that have eit-
her high or low degrees of regulatory interference (see Figure 1). Under this approa-
ch, a third party institution is given the authority to make decision on Shari’ah issues 
related to the Islamic finance. In the case of Pakistan, the Shari’ah Federal Court is the 
highest authority although there is national SSB at the State Bank of Pakistan level 
(Hasan, 2010; Hasan, 2012). According to Nomran and Haron (2020c), SSB is one of 
the most important mechanisms to deal with SG both within an institution (SSB at 
bank level) and within a jurisdiction (SSB at national level). Besides SSB mechanism, 
there are other mechanisms that deal with SG issues e.g. (Shari’ah audit at bank level) 
and (Shari’ah Federal Court at national level as in Pakistan).
Figure 1 summaries the SG regulatory models classification across jurisdictions ba-
sed on the degree of intervention of regulatory agencies. We adapted this Figure from 
the studies of (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Hasan, 2010; Hasan, 2011; Hasan, 2012; 
Hassan et al., 2013; Alkhamees, 2013; Grassa, 2015; Nomran et al., 2018). Figure 1 
also shows that the reactive and passive regulatory models are applied in unregulated 
jurisdictions. 
Figure 1.  SG regulatory models based on the degree of intervention of regulatory 
agencies.
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In general, only few empirical studies attempted to analyze the impact of SSB 
on the IB’s performance (see, e.g., Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Farag et al., 2017; 
Nomran et al., 2018; Hakimi et al., 2018). More specifically, limited studies that 
have examined the extent to which the impact of SSB on IBs performance can be 
affected by the differences in the SG regulatory models across jurisdictions. In this 
context, Nomran et al. (2018) examined the relationship between SSB and IBs’ per-
formance in Malaysia being a country that applies the most extreme intervention 
of regulatory agencies (pro-active model). To the best of our knowledge, however, 
there is no empirical study that has examined this relationship under the interven-
tionist model being applied in Pakistan so far. Thus, the current study extends the 
literature by examining how Shari’ah supervision mechanism, as represented by 
the SSB, and its characteristics, can influence IBs performance in Pakistan. 
There are at least three reasons that motivate us to conduct this empirical 
study. First, there is a need to evaluate the current SG practices in Pakistan. This 
would help to explore the strengths and drawbacks points of the Pakistani regu-
latory framework that are related to the SSBs structure2. From a survey, Majeed 
and Zainab (2018) found that SSBs in the Pakistani IBs do not perform their roles 
well. The reasons, as they argue, include the absence of comprehensive regulatory 
framework for Islamic banking in Pakistan, as well as the lack of IBs human capital. 
Thus, this study is anticipated to offer useful information for the IBs regulators and 
policy makers in Pakistan on the effectiveness of the adopted SG regulatory model. 
The findings from this study will be helpful for these respective parties in Pakistan 
to improve the current SG practices. This is more so especially to the State Bank 
of Pakistan which has taken numerous initiatives to enhance Islamic banking, for 
instance, launching a strategic plan for Islamic Banking aiming to strengthen legal 
and regulatory structure; and improving Shari’ah governance (see, Rashid and Ja-
been, 2016; Khan et al., 2017; Majeed and Zainab, 2018). 
Second, another motivation to justify the need to conduct the current study is 
related to the performance of the Pakistani IBs. Recently, Khan et al. (2017) con-
duct an empirical study in the Pakistani banking industry context and found that 
IBs are relatively better in profitability than CBs. According to their argument, a 
probable reason for this includes risk management practices of IBs in Pakistan that 
2 For example, Pakistan is among the countries that restrict the number of SSB positions a Shari’ah scho-
lar can hold (Alkhamees, 2013). Grassa (2013), Grassa (2015), and Nomran et al. (2018) indicate that 
some jurisdictions restrict the numbers of membership for scholars in SSBs while some other do not.
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are superior to CBs, as Shari’ah rules restrict pure speculation in monetary terms. 
As they mentioned, the Islamic principles dictates that all investments need to be 
backed by physical assets and pure speculation in money terms only is not allowed 
and that guarantee the stability and resilience of Islamic finance. They also indica-
ted that IBs are less risky and hold more cash relative to total assets. Thus, it would 
be interesting to empirically explore to what extent the existence of Shari’ah super-
vision mechanism contributes to the IBs performance growth in Pakistan. 
Third, as Nomran et al. (2018) claim, examining the relationships between the 
SSBs and the IBs performance among countries that adopt the different regulatory 
models may provide a better view of the best SG practices for the IBs. Nomran 
and Haron (2020c) also assert that there is a need for more empirical studies to 
examine whether the effect of SSB and its characteristics on IBs performance vary 
between IBs that operate in jurisdictions that adopt different degree of agencies 
intervention in SG practices.
Hypotheses Development
In this section, we discuss the hypotheses development that will be tested.
Shari’ah Governance Mechanism and Performance
According to Abdelsalam et al. (2016) and Quttainah and Almutairi (2017), SSBs of-
fer an extra possible reduction in agency costs for IBs through organizational moral 
accountability constraints and shaping managerial behaviour. Farag et al. (2017) sta-
te that the SSB might be a solution to the challenge of the second layer agency theory 
as it engages in actions such as providing advice to the BoD on activities that best 
suit the objective of societal benefits. The SSB has a supra authority to prevent the 
BoD from charging interest (riba) payments and to avoid doubtful (gharar) invest-
ments in their products (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Although economic calculation 
and the profit concerns of the IBs are allocated to the BoD, the appreciation of the 
licit character of this profit is allocated to the SSB (Ghayad, 2008). Thus, SSB plays 
an important role in mitigating agency problems by acting as an additional monito-
ring mechanism (see, e.g., Abdelsalam et al., 2016; Shibani and De Fuentes, 2017; 
Quttainah and Almutairi, 2017). Accordingly, SSB is one of the four key stakeholders 
affecting the financial performance of IBs, besides the management, the ownership 
and the external auditor (Mohammed and Muhammed, 2017).
A multitude of variables relating to the SSB characteristics such as the SSB 
size, cross-membership, doctoral qualification, reputation, and expertise may de-
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termine how effective the SSB is in conducting its task (Rahman and Bukair, 2013; 
Nomran et al., 2018). Given these characteristics, the Shari’ah supervision has been 
measured using different measurements. Mollah and Zaman (2015) employed SSB 
size as a single proxy of SSB governance. Safiullah and Shamsuddin (2018) utilized 
SSB index of three SSB characteristics (size, doctoral qualification, and reputation). 
However, Farook et al. (2011) and Rahman and Bukair (2013) developed a SSB 
score that captures the total impact of five SSB characteristics, namely, SSB size, 
cross-membership, doctoral qualification, reputation, and expertise (see Table 1). 
Recently, Nomran and Haron (2019) used the last score to measure SSB supervi-
sion. Similarly, the current study also employs this SSB score as it takes into con-
sideration the impact of all the above SSB characteristics. Thus, the following is 
proposed:
H1: Effective SSB, as represented by the SSB score, will be positively related to IBs 
performance.
SSB Characteristics and Performance
In this section, the authors establish the following hypotheses to explain the rela-
tionship between the above mentioned SSB characteristics and bank performance.
SSB Size
Some studies found a negative relationship between SSB size and IBs performance 
in support of the view that small corporate board size reduces the agency costs ac-
cording to the agency theory (AGT) (see, Matoussi and Grassa, 2012; Nomran and 
Haron, 2020a). In contrast, most studies found a positive relationship (see, Mollah 
and Zaman, 2015; Nomran et al., 2017; Farag et al., 2017; Hakimi et al., 2018; 
Nomran et al., 2018), in support of the stewardship theory (STD) and the resource 
dependence theory (RDT) (Nomran et al., 2018). The hypothesis is that:
H2a: SSB size will be positively related to IBs’ performance.
SSB Cross-memberships
According to the RDT, the corporate boards provide important resources for firms 
(Nomran et al., 2018). As such, cross-memberships can elevate the SSB knowledge 
and understanding regarding the Shari’ah practices in Islamic banking industry th-
rough discussions among the SSBs (Farook et al., 2011). A positive impact is found 
for the SSB cross-membership on the performance of IBs (Almutairi and Quttainah, 
2017; Nomran et al., 2018). Thus, we state this hypothesis:
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H2b: SSB cross-membership will be positively related to IBs performance.
SSB Doctoral Qualification
The RDT assumes that qualified board members play an important role in enhan-
cing the competitiveness of the firms (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005). SSB member 
with a doctoral qualification is expected to be better-versed in Islamic Finance and 
Banking fields (Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Nomran et al., 2018). Basically, SSBs 
qualifications are important for decision-making (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017). 
SSB members with advanced academic qualifications could improve their ability to 
operationalize Islamic principles into banking practices (Safiullah and Shamsud-
din, 2018). Empirically, Almutairi and Quttainah (2017) found a positive relati-
onship between the SSB doctoral qualification and performance of IBs. Here, the 
hypothesis is:
H2c: SSB educational qualification will be positively related to IBs performance.
SSB Reputation
The presence of reputable SSB scholars on an IB’s SSB is conducive for effective 
Shari’ah monitoring as they are well-placed to reduce the operational risk resul-
ting from Shari’ah non-compliance (Safiullah and Shamsuddin, 2018). This is in line 
with the RDT view that assumes the corporate boards provide important resour-
ces for firms (Nomran et al., 2018). Thus, IBs with reputable SSB members are of-
ten expected to earn higher profit (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017; Nomran et al., 
2018). Empirically, Nomran et al. (2018) found a positive effect for the SSB reputa-
tion on the Malaysia IBs financial performance. Hence, the following hypothesis is:
H2d: SSB reputation will be positively related to IBs performance.
SSB Expertise
SSB members with accounting, finance and/or economics knowledge or practice 
can positively affect the IB performance (Almutairi and Quttainah, 2017; Nomran 
et al., 2018). Therefore, the presence of SSB with experience in such field is impor-
tant for IBs. Many IBs have replaced their whole SSBs because the scholars have 
limited knowledge and exposure to both the Shari’ah principles and product know-
ledge (Bakar, 2016). Following the studies of Almutairi and Quttainah (2017), 
Nomran et al. (2017), and Nomran et al. (2018), we hypothesise that:
H2e: SSB expertise will be positively related to IBs’ performance.
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Figure 2 presents the study conceptual framework, whereas Table 1 provides a 
summary on the study hypotheses and the expected signs of the relationships.
Figure 2. Conceptual framework of independent and dependent variables.
Data and methodology
Sample
The sample used in this study is 11 IBs operating in Pakistan over the period from 
2007 to 2015 with 67 observations. Based on the BankScope database in 2016, the 
number of listed IBs in Pakistan was 11, and therefore, the study sample seems to 
be fairly representative because it includes almost all IBs in Pakistan. The data is 
merged from BankScope and hand collected from the annual reports of IBs for the 
sample period.
Measures of Variables
In this study, the dependent variable, which is the performance, is measured by 
two proxies, namely, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) following 
the literature (see, e.g. Matoussi and Grassa, 2012; Hakimi et al., 2018; Nomran et 
al., 2017).
Table 1 presents the measurements of the explanatory variables, which are 
Shari’ah supervision and the SSB characteristics following the studies of Farook et 
al. (2011) and Rahman and Bukair (2013). Similarly, Table 1 shows the measure-
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ments of the control variables (1/Z, EQTA, BSIZE and BAGE) following the litera-
ture (see, e.g., Mollah and Zaman, 2015). 
Table 1.
Variables, measurement, hypothesis and expected signs
Variables Definitions and coding Measurement Hypothesis
Dependent variables (bank performance)
ROA Return on assets Net income divided by average total 
assets
ROE Return on equity Net income divided by average total 
equity
Explanatory variables





SSB-SIZE    SSB size  N of scholars on the SSB H2a (+)
SSB-CR-
MEMP
SSB cross-membership % of scholars who sit on other SSBs H2b (+)
SSB-DQ SSB educational qualification % of scholars who have PhD degree H2c (+)
SSB-REPUT SSB reputation % of scholars who sit on SSB of AA-
OIFI & at least two SSBs
H2d (+)




1/Z The risk-taking variable 1/Z is estimated as 1/log Z-score**
EQTA Level of protection affor-
ded to the bank by the 
equity
Equity to total asset 
BSIZE Bank Size Log of total assets
BAGE Bank Age N of years since the bank was 
established
Notes: * The SSB score sums the value of the dichotomous characteristics of the SSB, namely (SSB size: “1” 
for banks with 5 or more members & “0” otherwise), (SSB cross-membership: “1” if at least one SSB schol-
ar with cross-membership & “0” otherwise), (SSB educational qualification: “1” if at least one SSB scholar 
with PhD & “0” otherwise), (SSB reputation: “1” if at least one SSB scholar sits on the SSB of AAOIFI and 
at least two Shari’ah board memberships & “0” otherwise) & (SSB expertise: “1” if at least one SSB scholar 
with experience and knowledge in the field of accounting/economic/finance & “0” otherwise). ** Z-score 
measures the distance to default, which is estimated as ROA plus capital to asset ratio divided by standard 
deviation of ROA (see, Mollah and Zaman, 2015).
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Estimation method and models
This study follows the same approach adopted by the existing empirical studies on 
the relationship between SG mechanism and performance of IBs. The study emp-
loys the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and random-effects (RE-GLS) methods 
followed by system-GMM for a robustness check. The GMM method is used fol-
lowing the recent studies of Pathan (2009), Nomran et al. (2017) and Hakimi et 
al. (2018), in which they first used the GLS-RE and checked the robustness of the 
results by using the GMM method while pooled OLS is used followed by the sys-
tem-GMM as employed by Mnasri (2015) and Oseni (2016).
The dynamic panel model using the system-GMM is employed to confirm the 
results of OLS and GLS-RE. System-GMM solves the problem of endogeneity as 
compared to the static and OLS models (Mnasri, 2015; Oseni, 2016). GMM can 
address the endogeneity issue that exists in CG and performance studies in gene-
ral (Haron, 2016; Haron, 2018) and more specifically in the SG and performance 
studies (Nomran et al., 2018). A one-step system-GMM is applied in the study fol-
lowing many studies (see, e.g., Tan, 2016; Hakimi et al., 2018). Hakimi et al. (2018) 
suggest using the one-step system-GMM estimator when the sample size is small. 
In their study, they used GLS-RE and one-step system-GMM to analyze a small 
sample of 13 IBs over 6 years with 91 observations.3 
To test the hypotheses based on static models, the following models are 
employed:
PERFORMANCE it = β0,i + β1 SSB-SCORE it + β2 1/Z it + β3 EQTA it + 
                                       β4 BSIZE it + β5 BAGE it + ε it ………………………...…. (1a)
PERFORMANCE it = β0,i + β1 SSB-SIZE �t + β2 SSB-CRMEMP it + 
                                       β3 SSB-DQ it + β4 SSB-REPUT it + β5 SSB-EXPER it + 
                                       β6 1/Z it + β7 EQTA it + β8 BSIZE it + β9 BAGE it + ε it …...(2a)
3 Mnasri (2015) also used OLS, fixed effects and system-GMM to analyse a sample of 10 banks. Recently, 
Oyewumi et al. (2018) examined the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment and 
disclosure on performance using panel data set from 12 Nigerian banks with 60 observations. Many 
existing studies on the SG and IBs performance used a small sample size such as Kusuma and Ayumar-
dani (2016) and Wahyudi et al. (2018) who used 11 IBs over five years.
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Further, the following models are related to GMM estimator. 
PERFORMANCE it = β0,i + β1 PERFORMANCE it(-1) + β2 SSB-SCORE it + β3 1/Z it + 
                                       β4 EQTA it + β5 BSIZE it + β6 BAGE it + ε it ……….…….. (1b)
     PERFORMANCE it = β0,i + β1 PERFORMANCE it(-1) + β2 SSB-SIZE it + 
                                       β3 SSB-CRMEMP it + β4 SSB-DQ it + β5 SSB-REPUT it +
                                       β6 SSB-EXPER it + β7 1/Z it + β8 EQTA it + β9 BSIZE it + 
                                       β10 BAGE it + ε it ……………………………………...….. (2b)
where, i indicates the IBs (i=1,….,11) and t indicates the annual time period 
(t=2007,….,2015), PERFORMANCE = performance of IBs, SSB-SCORE = SSB score, 
SSB-SIZE = SSB size, SSB-CRMEMP = SSB cross-membership, SSB-DQ = SSB educa-
tional qualification, SSB-REPUT = SSB reputation, SSB-EXPER = SSB expertise, 1/Z 
= 1/log Z-score; EQTA = Equity to total asset, BSIZE = Bank size, BAGE = Bank age.  
Analysis and Findings
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides the results of descriptive statistics for the variables. As Table 2 pre-
sents, the mean of dependent variables (ROA and ROE) are 0.757 and 5.364 respecti-
vely. Table 2 also presents that the mean of explanatory variables (SSB-SIZE, SSB-C-
RMEMP, SSB-DQ, SSB-REPUT, and SSB-EXPER) are (2.487, 0.373, 0.579, 0.139 and 
0.621). Further, the mean of SSB-SCORE is 2.667 reflecting almost half the value of 
the score which is 5, in average. Table 2 provides the results of descriptive statistics 
for the control variables (1/Z, EQTA, BSIZE, BAGE).
Table 2 also depicts that variables follow a normal distribution based on skewness 
and kurtosis statistics. All the variables are below the guidelines for skewness and kur-
tosis (< 3 and < 10, respectively) as suggested by Kline (2005).
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Table 2.








ROA 67 0.757 1.778 -3.030 6.668 0.956 4.915
ROE 67 5.364 10.451 -27.800 32.133 -0.524 4.018
Explanatory  variables
SSB-SCORE 67 2.667 1.136 1.000 5.000 0.198 1.790
SSB-SIZE    67 2.487 1.544 1.000 7.000 0.706 2.708
SSB-CR-
MEMP
67 0.373 0.410 0.000 1.000 0.501 1.599
SSB-DQ 67 0.579 0.401 0.000 1.000 -0.208 1.528
SSB-REPUT 67 0.139 0.219 0.000 0.667 1.176 2.850
SSB-EXPER 67 0.621 0.352 0.000 1.000 -0.223 1.655
Bank-specific variables
1/Z 67 0.989 0.171 0.656 1.291 -0.187 2.835
EQTA 67 0.195 0.188 0.051 0.781 1.839 5.391
BSIZE 67 5.583 0.643 4.505 6.705 -0.058 1.880
BAGE 67 1.169 0.381 0.000 1.869 -0.681 3.987
Notes: N = Number of observations; Number of IBs = 11. 
Correlation
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables. The hi-
ghest correlation between the variables is between SSB-SCORE and SSB-REPUT (r 
= 0.77). However, based on Table 3, it is noticed that all the correlation coefficients 
are less than 0.95, hence, the collinearity between the variables is not a concern, as 
suggested by Gujarati and Porter (2009). 
As Table 3 shows, there are some significant correlations between the variab-
les. The ROA shows a significant correlation with many variables (p = 0.01) such as 
SSB-CRMEMP, SSB-DQ, SSB-EXPER, EQTA, BSIZE and BAGE. The ROE also has a 
significant correlation with the SSB-CRMEMP, SSB-DQ, SSB-SCORE, and BAGE (p 
= 0.01).
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No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 ROA 1.00
2 ROE 0.65a 1.00




0.51a 0.56a 0.15 1.00
5 SSB-DQ -0.39a -0.26b -0.30a -0.40a 1.00
6 SSB-REPUT -0.02 0.17 0.38a 0.57a 0.12 1.00
7 SSB-EXPER 0.34a 0.11 -0.39a -0.18 -0.19c -0.55a 1.00
8 SSB-SCORE 0.16 0.31a 0.70a 0.47a -0.01 0.77a -0.40a 1.00 
9 1/Z 0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.14 0.14 0.08 -0.15 0.08 1.00
10 EQTA 0.57a 0.11 -0.29b 0.17 -0.16 -0.18 0.11 -0.19 0.01 1.00
11 BSIZE -0.39a 0.03 0.42a -0.01 -0.05 0.28b -0.24b 0.30a -0.04 -0.73a 1.00
12 BAGE 0.39a 0.31a -0.11 -0.09 -0.18c -0.49a 0.64a -0.23b 0.03 0.00 -0.21b 1.00
Notes: a, b and c represent correlation are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ROA 
= Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; SSB-SIZE = SSB size; SSB-CRMEMP = SSB 
cross-membership; SSB-DQ = SSB educational qualification; SSB-REPUT = SSB reputation; 
SSB-EXPER = SSB expertise; SSB-SCORE = SSB score; 1/Z = 1/log Z-score; EQTA = Equity to 
total asset; BSIZE = Bank size; BAGE = Bank age.   
Diagnostic Test
As Table 4 presents, no multicollinearity problem is found in the data, as the va-
riance inflation factor (VIF) of variables is less than 10. As a rule of thumb, if the 
VIF of a variable exceeds 10, that variable is said to be highly collinear (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009).
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Table 4.
Results of variance inflation factors (VIF)
Test VIF VIF
Model Variables ROA ROE 














Notes: ROA = Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; SSB-SCORE = SSB 
score; SSB-SIZE = SSB size; SSB-CRMEMP = SSB cross-membership; SSB-DQ = 
SSB educational qualification; SSB-REPUT = SSB reputation; SSB-EXPER = SSB 
expertise; 1/Z = 1/log Z-score; EQTA = Equity to total asset; BSIZE = Bank size; 
BAGE = Bank age.
Hypotheses Test
In this part, the results of hypotheses testing are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 
based on OLS, GLS-RE and system-GMM models. As Mnasri (2015) argues, esti-
mating such different models is beneficial in order to understand biases that arise 
from ignoring different aspects of endogeneity.
Results of the First Hypothesis (Model 1)
Table 5 presents the results of first hypothesis testing. For the OLS regression, Tab-
le 5 shows that the overall R2 for all the measurements (ROA, ROE), are relatively 
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high (Model (1a)-Panel A: 0.63, 0.30) which indicates that the model is appropriate 
and the chosen parameters are good estimators of performance. Based on the OLS 
results, SSB-SCORE is found to positively affect the ROA and ROE (Significance 
level = 0.05, 0.05).
Table 5. 
Empirical results of OLS, GLS-RE and dynamic GMM-System estimations for (Model 1)
Model (1a) (1a) (1b)
Hypothesis H1 H1 H1
Panel Panel A: OLS Panel B: GLS-RE Panel C: 
GMM-System
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Notes: Standard coefficients are presented (p-values in parentheses). ***,  ** and * are significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. The Wald test statistic refers to the null: all coefficients on the Shari’ah supervi-
sion and control variables are jointly equal to zero. Significant values of AR(1) show that null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation among error terms in first-order autocorrelation is rejected. AR(2) or second-order 
autocorrelation test refers to the null: no second-order correlation in the residuals. Wald x2 statistics: the 
test is a way of testing the significance of particular explanatory variables in a statistical model. Sargan 
test for validity of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as indicated under null. This test of over-iden-
tifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as x2 under the null of instrument validity. The reported 
t-statistics with GLS-RE estimates are robust to random fixed-effect (after comparing GLS-RE with fixed 
effects model based on Hausman test which confirms the appropriateness of the GLS-RE estimation). ROA 
= Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; SSB-SCORE = SSB score; 1/Z = 1/log Z-score; EQTA = Equity 
to total asset; BSIZE = Bank size; BAGE = Bank age.
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Based on the random-effects GLS, Table 5 shows that regression is well-fit-
ted with an overall R2 of 0.63, 0.26 for the two measurements (ROA, ROE) with 
statistically significant Wald chi-square (X2) statistics. Additionally, the Hausman 
test confirms the appropriateness of the GLS-RE estimation procedure used in this 
study for both measurements (ROA, ROE) (Model (1a)-Panel B: p = 0.16, 0.83) (see, 
Hakimi et al., 2018). However, no significant effect is found for the SSB-SCORE on 
performance based on GLS-RE estimation. 
Table 5 also shows the results of hypotheses testing based on the system-GMM 
estimation for the model (1b), panel C. The diagnostics tests reported in the Table 
5 present that the model is well fitted as AR(1) and AR(2) satisfy the conditions 
that there is first-order autocorrelation but no second-order, as suggested by the 
literature (see, e.g., Nadeem et al., 2017). As Table 5 depicts, the model (1b) is well 
fitted with statistically significant test statistics for the Wald test, indicating that 
the instruments are valid in the GMM estimation for the two measurements (ROA, 
ROE) (Model (1b)-Panel C: p = 0.00, 0.00). In addition, the Sargan test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of correct specification for the two measurements (ROA, 
ROE) (Model (1b)-Panel C: p = 0.23, 0.10) (see, Hakimi et al., 2018). 
Based on the system-GMM findings, SSB-SCORE is found to positively affect 
the ROA and ROE (Model (1b)-Panel C: Significance level = 0.10, 0.05) which sup-
ports the findings based on the OLS. 
Results of the Second Hypothesis (Model 2)
Table 6 presents the results of second hypothesis testing. For the OLS regression, 
Table 6 shows that the overall R2 for all the measurements (ROA, ROE), are re-
latively high (Model (2a)-Panel A: 0.80, 0.52) which indicates that the model are 
appropriate. As the OLS results depict, out of the five SSB characteristics only a 
positive relationship is found between SSB cross-membership and the two measu-
rements (ROA, ROE) (Significance level = 0.01, 0.01).
Table 6. 
Empirical results of OLS, GLS-RE and dynamic GMM-System estimations for (Model 2
Model (2a) (2a) (2b)
Hypothesis H2 (a, b, c, d & e) H2 (a, b, c, d & e) H2 (a, b, c, d & e)
Panel A: OLS B: GLS-RE C: GMM-System
Variables ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE 
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Notes: Standard coefficients are presented (p-values in parentheses). ***,  ** and * are significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. The Wald test statistic refers to the null: all coefficients on the SSB characteris-
tics and control variables are jointly equal to zero; Significant values of AR(1) show that null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation among error terms in first-order autocorrelation is rejected. AR(2) or second-order 
autocorrelation test refers to the null: no second-order correlation in the residuals; Wald x2 statistics: the 
test is a way of testing the significance of particular explanatory variables in a statistical model. Sargan 
test for validity of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as indicated under null. This test of over-iden-
tifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as x2 under the null of instrument validity. The reported 
t-statistics with GLS RE estimates are robust to random fixed-effect (after comparing GLS-RE with fixed 
effects model based on Hausman test which confirms the appropriateness of the GLS-RE estimation). ROA 
= Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; SSB-SIZE = SSB size; SSB-CRMEMP = SSB cross-membership; 
SSB-DQ = SSB educational qualification; SSB-REPUT = SSB reputation; SSB-EXPER = SSB expertise; 1/Z = 
1/log Z-score; EQTA = Equity to total asset; BSIZE = Bank size; BAGE = Bank age.  
For the GLS-RE, Table 6 shows that regression is well-fitted with an overall R2 
of 0.86, 0.59 for the ROA and ROE with statistically significant Wald chi-square 
(X2) statistics. Also, the Hausman test confirms the appropriateness of the GLS-RE 
estimation procedure used in this study for ROA and ROE (Model (2a)-Panel B: p 
= 0.20, 0.96). The RE-GLS estimation confirms the findings of OLS estimation on 
that only a positive relationship is found between SSB cross-membership and the 
two measurements (ROA, ROE) (Significance level = 0.01, 0.01). 
Regarding the system-GMM estimation, Table 6 shows the results of hypot-
heses testing for the model (2b), panel C. As Table 6 depicts, the diagnostics tests 
shows that the model is well fitted as AR(1) and AR(2) satisfy the conditions that 
there is first-order autocorrelation but no second-order. Further, the model is well 
fitted with statistically significant test statistics for the Wald test, indicating that 
the instruments are valid in the GMM estimation for the two measurements (ROA, 
ROE) (Model (2b)-Panel C: p = 0.00, 0.00). Finally, the Sargan test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of correct specification for the two measurements (ROA, ROE) 
(Model (2b)-Panel C: p = 0.20, 0.10). 
A system-GMM findings confirm that SSB cross-membership is positively re-
lated to the ROE (Model (2b)-Panel C: Significance level = 0.01) while no effect is 
found in terms of ROA. Additionally, it is found that SSB-EXPER is negatively rela-
ted to ROA and ROE (Model (2a)-Panel B: Significance level = 0.01, 0.10).
Discussion of the Findings
Nomran, Haron, Financial Performance in Islamic Banking and Shari’ah Supervision under Interventionist Regulatory Approach: 
 A System-GMM Dynamic Panel Analysis
21
Table 7 provides a summary for the study hypotheses testing and the findings of 
the study.
Table 7.
Summarized of study hypotheses testing and findings
Panel A: OLS B: GLS-RE C: GMM-System Hypot-
hesis 
Testing 














































































































Note: Standard coefficients are presented. ***,  ** and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% res-
pectively. ROA = Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; SSB-SCORE = SSB score; SSB-SIZE 
= SSB size; SSB-CRMEMP = SSB cross-membership; SSB-DQ = SSB educational qualification; 
SSB-REPUT = SSB reputation; SSB-EXPER = SSB expertise.
Based on the findings of the first hypothesis, Table 7 shows that OLS estima-
tion and system-GMM provide almost the same results that SSB supervision has 
a positive effect on the performance of IBs but with weak significance levels (5 
percent and 10 percent). In contrast, the GLS-RE fails to prove any significant rela-
tionship between the SSB supervision and the performance. 
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For the second hypothesis, Table 7 presents that all the three estimations (OLS, 
GLS-RE, and system-GMM) almost find a positive relationship between the SSB 
cross-membership and the performance (H2b) for the two measurements (ROA, 
ROE) with the exception of system-GMM which only supports ROE. In contrast, 
the system-GMM findings assert that SSB-EXPER is negatively related to ROA and 
ROE, while the other estimations (OLS and GLS-RE) fail to prove this relationship. 
However, given the presence of endogeneity issue in the CG and bank perfor-
mance studies as mentioned above, a Hausman endogeneity test is conducted fol-
lowing the literature (see, e.g., Mnasri, 2015; Rashid and Jabeen, 2016) as Table 
8 presents. Table 8 proves the existence of endogeneity as shown by Durbin-Wu–
Hausman tests for the two models (1 and 2). The results reveal that endogeneity 
is a major concern, confirming the fact that the system-GMM is more appropriate 
than OLS and GLS-RE estimates4. Hence, the findings of dynamic system-GMM 
are used to test the study hypotheses. 
Table 8.
Results of endogeneity test
Model  (1)  (2)
Variables ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Durbin-Wu–Hausman tests (Endogeneity Test):
H0: Variables are exogenous

















Notes: ROA = Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity. Endogeneity test is 
conducted following the studies of Rashid and Jabeen (2016) and Mnasri (2015).
4 Thus, the base model is the system-GMM, while the Static models are provided to show all the conducted 
steps of analysis. 
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As Table 7 shows, the system-GMM findings indicate that the first hypothesis 
(H1) is supported for the two performance measurements (ROA, ROE) (Significan-
ce level = 0.10, 0.05). However, the level of significance at (10 and 5 percent), res-
pectively implies that the relationship between SSB supervision and the Pakistani 
IBs performance is not very strong. The results seem to confirm that of Majeed and 
Zainab (2018) who found that SSBs in the Pakistani IBs are not performing their 
roles perfectly.
For the second hypotheses (H2a-e), the system-GMM findings show that two 
out of the five sub-hypotheses are supported which are the H2b and H2e. As Table 7 
presents, SSB cross-membership is found to positively affect the performance only 
for the ROE while no effect is found in terms of ROA; the H2b hypothesis is, thus, 
supported for the ROE. This result is in support of Nomran et al. (2018) who found 
a positive impact for the SSB cross-membership on the Malaysian IBs performance. 
A possible reason for this, as Nomran et al. (2017) argue, belongs to the restricti-
on of scholars’ memberships across SSBs of IBs in Malaysia. As such, Pakistan is 
among countries that restrict the number of SSB positions a Shari’ah scholar can 
hold (Alkhamees, 2013). This also may justify why the SSB cross-membership is po-
sitively related to the Pakistani IBs performance. Table 2 proves the restrictions of 
SSB cross-membership in the Pakistani IBs as they have a modest SSB cross-mem-
bership percentage (37%) on average.
Table 7 also shows that SSB experience is negatively related to ROA and ROE ba-
sed on the system-GMM. Therefore, the H2e hypothesis is supported for the ROA 
and ROE, but with a different sign. The negative relationship is in contrast to the 
H2e hypothesis, where a positive relationship is expected. This result supports the 
findings of Nomran et al. (2018) who found a negative relationship between SSB 
experience and the Malaysia IBs performance. According to Table 2, the average of 
SSB expertise in accounting/finance is high (62%). However, no more information 
on the percentage of the scholars with Shari’ah and law in the Pakistani IBs is found 
in this study. Therefore, the real reason on why SSB expertise has a negative impact 
on the performance of IBs in Pakistan is still ambiguous. For this, it is recommen-
ded for future research to examine this issue empirically by two steps. First, the 
descriptive analysis should distinguish in details between scholars who specialized 
in accounting/finance/economic versus those who specialized in Shari’ah and law. 
This would provide a clear conclusion about the percentage of scholars’ specializa-
tions in the SSBs. Second, the impact of each category (accounting/finance/eco-
nomic vs. Shari’ah and law) on the IBs should be examined separately in order to 
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explore which specialization is responsible for the negative effect on performance. 
Importantly, such research is recommended not only for the Pakistani IBs, but for 
the Malaysian IBs and the other countries as well.
In contrast, the findings of the system-GMM indicate that the three hypothe-
ses (H2a, H2c, and H2d) which are related to the SSB size, SSB educational qualifica-
tion, and SSB reputation, respectively, are not supported. These findings are not 
consistent with many existing studies such as those of Nomran et al. (2017) and 
Nomran et al. (2018) in which they found a significant impact for these SSB cha-
racteristics on IBs performance. This may reflect that SG practices in the Pakistani 
IBs are still weak as compared to what should be applied. 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the impact of the SSB 
supervision on the Pakistani IBs performance is not strong enough. This is sup-
ported by examining the impact of SSB characteristics (size, cross-membership, 
educational qualification, reputation and expertise). Out of these five characteris-
tics, only SSB cross-membership and experience positively and negatively affect 
the performance of Pakistani IBs while the effect is absent for the other three cha-
racteristics (size, educational qualification, and reputation). This implies that SG 
practices in the Pakistani IBs still suffer from some drawbacks which require more 
improvements by the respective regulators. In general, the current SG practices 
across jurisdictions still suffer from some drawbacks especially in the regulatory 
frameworks relating to the SSB’s roles (Grassa, 2015). For example, IBs are subject 
to different regulations under which they operate and this resulted in different re-
solution. For instance, some jurisdictions restrict the SSB cross-membership while 
some others give allowance to it. Therefore, it is still questionable whether such 
resolution is beneficial in enhancing the SSB effectiveness and IBs performance or 
not (Nomran and Haron, 2020b). 
This conclusion is in consistent with the findings of Majeed and Zainab (2017) 
who found that the role of SSBs in the Pakistani IBs is not up to the mark, and 
this role cannot be improved without ensuring the availability of adequate human 
capital. They added that SSBs in the Pakistani IBs cannot play their true role until 
IBs have separate central bank. Majeed and Zainab (2018) also found that SSBs 
in the Pakistani IBs not performing their roles well and one of the reasons lies in 
the absence of comprehensive regulatory framework. Although Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) provided support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision for 
IBs across countries, they also emphasized the need for enforcement and regula-
tory mechanism for them to be more effective. Regarding this, the regulatory fra-
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mework that the Pakistani authorities apply may be blamed for the SG weakness5. 
For example, Table 2 shows that the average of SSB size is very small in Pakistan 
(2.48) as compared to other different countries such as Malaysia (4.8) (see, Nom-
ran et al., 2018). To ensure effective board performance, it is argued that the SSB 
size should comprise between three and seven members as suggested by Rahman 
and Bukair (2013) or between three and six members as suggested by Nomran and 
Haron (2020a). Similarly, the average of SSB reputation is modest (13%) (see Table 
2). The regulatory framework therefore should cover this gap by imposing more 
qualified scholars in the SSBs for IBs.
Pakistan adopts an interventionist regulatory model which gives third party 
institution the authority to take decision on Shari’ah issues related to the Islamic 
finance, as well as there is national SSB at the State Bank of Pakistan level. Under 
these circumstances, the regulators may give more attention to the Shari’ah super-
vision at the national level and neglect that on the institutional level (SSB at IBs). 
Thus, the Pakistani regulators should give more power to the SSBs at the instituti-
onal level in order to make related decisions. 
However, a concern is also raised regarding the role of SSBs in Pakistani IBs 
whether it is advisory or supervisory. Mollah and Zaman (2015) found that SSBs 
positively affect IBs’ performance when they perform a supervisory role but the 
impact is negligible when they have only one advisory role. Future research, hence, 
should examine this issue empirically to explore if the role of SSBs is advisory or 
supervisory and how can this affect the performance of banks. Furthermore, fu-
ture research should examine the relationship between SSB and regular boards of 
directors (BoD) under the Pakistani interventionist regulatory approach, and how 
these boards together can affect the performance of IBs. This may show to what 
extent SSB is given a power as compared to the BoD under such approach. 
Conclusion and Implications
The unique Islamic banking business model imposes some unique agency issu-
es for IBs besides the common agency problems that occur between managers 
5 According to Grassa (2015), Pakistani law neglects discussing the composition of SSB at institutional 
level, instead it discusses that each IB in Pakistan should only have a Shari'ah Advisor. In contrast, 
there are many details regarding the composition of the national SSB in Pakistan such as its size which 
should consist of at least five members (at least 2 members of them have to be Shari'ah scholars, 1 
member to be a Chartered Accountant, 1 a lawyer while 1 representing the bankers and the State Bank 
of Pakistan).
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and shareholders. For this, the governance structure of IBs includes the SSB be-
sides the BoD, which acts as additional governance mechanism affecting the IBs 
performance.
As a response to the rapid growth of IBs, many countries develop different 
SG regulatory models to regulate the Islamic banking and finance activities. One 
of these countries is Pakistan which adopts a unique interventionist regulatory 
approach. This approach differs from the other adopted approaches in the other 
countries that have either high or low degrees of regulatory interference. Gene-
rally, the relationship between Shari’ah supervision and IBs’ performance is still 
ambiguous particularly for banks across countries that have a different regulatory 
environment. As such, there is no empirical study that has examined the relations-
hip between SSB and IBs performance in Pakistan. Thus, the current study aims 
to fill the literature gap by examining how SSB mechanism and its characteristics 
can influence IBs performance in Pakistan. The performance-governance relati-
onship is estimated using a range of econometric techniques including a dynamic 
system-GMM estimator for a sample comprises 11 IBs for the period from 2007 to 
2015.
Conducting this study is important as there is a need to evaluate the current 
SG practices in Pakistan. This would help to explore the strengths and drawbacks 
points of the Pakistani regulatory framework which will help in improving the cur-
rent framework. Additionally, it would be interesting to empirically explore to what 
extent the existence of SSB contributes to the IBs performance growth in Pakistan.
The findings reveal a modest support for a positive association between Shari’ah 
supervision and performance. It is also found that SSB cross-membership and expe-
rience; are positively and negatively related to the performance of Pakistani IBs, res-
pectively. The study concludes that SG practices in the Pakistani IBs still suffer from 
some drawbacks which require more improvements by the respective regulators. The 
regulatory framework that the Pakistani authorities apply may be blamed for these 
weaknesses. It seems that the regulators have given more attention to the Shari’ah 
supervision at the national level as compared to that on the institutional level (SSB 
at IBs). An obvious indicator for this inference is the small SSB size and the modest 
percentage of reputable scholars in the SSBs in the Pakistani IBs. Further, the absen-
ce for any significant impact for many SSB characteristics as the study depicted.
The findings of this study would help the respective regulators in Pakistan to 
improve the current SG practices especially when the State Bank of Pakistan has 
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taken numerous initiatives to enhance Islamic banking, including improving SG 
practices. Thus, this study suggests some important practical implications for re-
gulators in Pakistan. First, regulators should give more power to the SSBs at the 
institutional level in order to make related decisions. Second, the regulatory fra-
mework should impose IBs to have large SSB size and more qualified scholars in 
the SSBs for IBs.
However, more research is needed to justify the negative relationship between 
SSB experience and the performance of not only for IBs in Pakistan but also for IBs 
across countries. Future research should also examine whether the role of SSBs is 
advisory or supervisory and how can this affect the IBs performance in Pakistan. 
Finally, there is a need for research on the relationship between SSB and BoD under 
the Pakistani interventionist regulatory approach, and how these boards together 
can affect the performance of IBs. 
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